ActPlane Policy Examples

This cookbook turns the test policy corpus into user-facing examples. Each example shows the problem, the rule, how to review it before enforcement, and what violation to expect.

Start every policy with a static review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/01_secret_no_exfil.yaml --explain
actplane doctor --policy test/policies/01_secret_no_exfil.yaml

Then enforce around a command:

sudo -E actplane --policy test/policies/01_secret_no_exfil.yaml run -- <agent-or-command>

Use notify policies or actplane compile --explain first when adapting a policy to a real repository. Rules that use block need BPF-LSM support for pre-operation denial; see support-matrix.md.

Example Map

Scenario	Policy file	Main primitive
Secret-derived data cannot leave the host	`test/policies/01_secret_no_exfil.yaml`	file source + network/file sinks
Untrusted input needs review before privileged action	`test/policies/02_prompt_injection_review.yaml`	endpoint/file source + endorsement
Production database access must pass through a tool	`test/policies/03_mediation_lineage.yaml`	lineage mediation
Agent writes stay inside the workspace	`test/policies/04_workspace_confinement.yaml`	lineage-scoped write block
Tests must run before commit	`test/policies/06_test_before_commit_since.yaml`	temporal gate + staleness
Review or audit subagent is read-only	`actplane init --template readonly-review`	subtree capability scope
Local secrets can be released only after redaction	`test/policies/08_secret_declassify.yaml`	declassification
Agent cannot bypass git policy through shell/Python	`test/policies/09_cross_tool_git.yaml`	process tree coverage
Release artifacts need human review	`test/policies/19_reviewed_release.yaml`	file source + endorsement
Child domains inherit parent policy	`test/policies/24_domain_session_auto_select.yaml`	domains

Secret-Derived Data Must Stay Local

Problem: an agent reads .env or /etc/secrets/**, then a later subprocess tries to connect to the network or write into a shared export path.

version: 1
policy: |
  source SECRET = file "**/.env"
  source SECRET = file "/etc/secrets/**"
 
  rule no-exfil:
    block connect endpoint "*" if SECRET
    block write file "/shared/**" if SECRET
    because "secret data must not leave the host"

Review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/01_secret_no_exfil.yaml --explain

Expected violation: a process that has read a secret source and then connects out receives a no-exfil match with the reason secret data must not leave the host.

Prompt-Injection Review Gate

Problem: task context comes from the network or downloads, and then the agent tries to run privileged actions such as git push or deployment.

version: 1
policy: |
  source UNTRUST = endpoint "*"
  source UNTRUST = file "**/downloads/**"
 
  rule no-injected-priv:
    block exec "git" "push" if UNTRUST and not REVIEWED
    block exec "**/deploy*" if UNTRUST and not REVIEWED
    because "untrusted input must not drive privileged actions"
 
  endorse REVIEWED by exec "**/human-approve"

Review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/02_prompt_injection_review.yaml --explain

Expected violation: privileged actions derived from untrusted input are blocked until an approved review command adds the REVIEWED label.

Production Database Through Migration Tool

Problem: prod.db should be opened only by the migration tool, not by ad-hoc agent scripts.

version: 1
policy: |
  rule mediate-proddb:
    block open file "**/prod.db" unless lineage-includes exec "**/migrate"
    because "prod.db only via the migration tool"

Review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/03_mediation_lineage.yaml --explain

Expected violation: direct opens of prod.db are blocked. Opens from a process whose lineage includes migrate are allowed.

Workspace Confinement

Problem: a coding agent can use bash, scripts, or generated programs to write outside its assigned workspace.

version: 1
policy: |
  source AGENT = exec "**/codex"
 
  rule confine-writes:
    block write file "/**" if AGENT unless target "/work/**"
    block unlink file "/**" if AGENT unless target "/work/**"
    because "agent may only modify /work"

Review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/04_workspace_confinement.yaml --explain

Expected violation: writes or deletes outside /work/** from the agent process tree are blocked.

Fresh Tests Before Commit

Problem: the agent ran tests once, edited source again, and then committed with stale test evidence.

version: 1
policy: |
  source AGENT = exec "**/codex"
 
  rule test-before-commit:
    block exec "git" "commit" if AGENT unless after exec "**/pytest" since write "src/**" or write "tests/**"
    because "tests are stale after source edits"

Review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/06_test_before_commit_since.yaml --explain

Expected violation: git commit from the agent tree is denied unless pytest has run after the latest write to src/** or tests/**.

Read-Only Review or Audit Subagent

Problem: a review or audit subagent should inspect evidence only. It should not write files, delete files, or make repository changes.

version: 1
policy: |
  source REVIEWER = exec "**/review-agent"
 
  rule readonly-review:
    block write file "/**" if REVIEWER
    block unlink file "/**" if REVIEWER
    block exec "git" if REVIEWER
    because "review domain is read-only"

Review:

actplane init --template readonly-review --out actplane.yaml
actplane compile --policy actplane.yaml --explain

Expected violation: any write, delete, or git execution in the review-agent subtree reports readonly-review.

Redaction Path for Secrets

Problem: secret-derived data should not leave the host unless it has passed through a redactor.

version: 1
policy: |
  source SECRET = file "**/.env"
 
  rule no-exfil:
    block connect endpoint "*" if SECRET
    because "redact secrets before egress"
 
  declassify SECRET by exec "**/redact"

Review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/08_secret_declassify.yaml --explain

Expected violation: network egress after reading .env is blocked. A sanctioned redaction command can clear the label for the redacted path.

Cross-Tool Git Policy

Problem: a tool-layer rule can block a direct git tool call but miss bash -c git ... or Python subprocess.run(["git", ...]).

version: 1
policy: |
  source AGENT = exec "**/codex"
 
  rule no-git:
    block exec "git" if AGENT
    because "git is disabled for this agent"

Review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/09_cross_tool_git.yaml --explain

Expected violation: any descendant process that executes git is blocked, regardless of whether the path came through a tool call, shell, script, or SDK.

Reviewed Release

Problem: a release artifact under dist/** should not be published by an agent until a review step endorsed the session.

version: 1
policy: |
  source AGENT = exec "**/codex"
  source RELEASE = file "dist/**"
 
  rule release-needs-review:
    block exec "gh" "release" if AGENT and RELEASE and not REVIEWED
    block connect endpoint "*" if AGENT and RELEASE and not REVIEWED
    because "release artifacts need human review before publishing"
 
  endorse REVIEWED by exec "**/review"

Review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/19_reviewed_release.yaml --explain

Expected violation: release publication or external egress is blocked until a review command adds REVIEWED.

Parent and Child Domains

Problem: parent policy should apply to all children, while a helper domain adds extra local rules for its own subtree.

version: 1
 
rules:
  protect-policy:
    ifc: |
      source COMMAND = exec "**"
      rule protect-policy:
        kill write file "**/actplane.yaml" if COMMAND
        because "active policy is protected"
 
  read-only-helper:
    ifc: |
      source COMMAND = exec "**"
      rule read-only-helper:
        kill write file "/repo/**" if COMMAND
        because "helper domain is read-only"
 
domains:
  session:
    bind:
      - rule: protect-policy
        mode: locked
 
  helper:
    parent: session
    bind:
      - rule: read-only-helper
        mode: locked

Review:

actplane compile --policy test/policies/24_domain_session_auto_select.yaml --domains
actplane compile --policy test/policies/24_domain_session_auto_select.yaml --domain helper --explain

Expected violation: the helper domain inherits parent policy protection and adds its local read-only rule. Child domains cannot remove locked parent rules.

From Template to Policy

Many examples also exist as built-in templates:

actplane init --list-templates
actplane init --template test-before-commit --print
actplane init --template workspace-confinement --set writable_path=/repo/tasks/** --out actplane.yaml
actplane compile --explain --report-out docs/actplane-review.txt

Use templates for the first policy in a project, then promote tuned examples into project-owned actplane.yaml.

继续阅读

返回索引

ActPlane: eBPF-Based IFC Policy Engine for AI Agent Harnesses

![License: MIT](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)

ActPlane Compared with Existing Products

This page positions ActPlane against products that teams already use for AI guardrails, sandboxes, observability, and runtime security.

ActPlane Empirical Study

This directory keeps the curated empirical-study artifacts that are useful to understand why ActPlane's policy language targets process, file, network, and temporal agent behavior.

最后更新: 2026年6月26日
首次发布: 2026年6月26日
贡献者: 云微

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